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  This paper discusses the tensions between antitrust policy and industrial policy from 
a U.S. perspective.  In the late 1970s and the 1980s, in the wake of the slowdown of the U.S. 
economy and the apparent ascendancy of the Japanese economy, the pluses and minuses of 
a formal industrial policy were debated in the U.S.; but there was never an explicit adoption 
of anything that had the appearance of a formal industrial policy.  Nevertheless, there is a 
long tradition of governmental intervention in the U.S. that is at odds with the spirit and 
letter of antitrust policy's pursuit of more competitive and efficient markets. 
  
  After offering definitions of antitrust and of industrial policy, this paper offers details 
on the types of governmental intervention that are at odds with antitrust.  It then provides 




















  Antitrust Policy and Industrial Policy: A View from the U.S. 
 
  Lawrence J. White 
I. Introduction 
 
  Antitrust policy and industrial policy are almost always in an uneasy condition of 
coexistence with each other.  This is especially true for Europe, where a longer and stronger tradition 
of formal state intervention in the economy and of a distrust of markets has crystallized into various 
forms of "industrial policy", often expressed as the support and protection of "national champions".
1 
 Antitrust -- and especially antitrust with real enforcement -- has a more recent existence in Europe. 
  By contrast, in the United States, the tradition of antitrust extends back for over a century, 
and the faith in markets is stronger.  It was no accident that the deregulation movement that reduced 
governmental regulation that had impeded competition in transportation, telecommunications, 
financial, and energy markets first began in the U.S. in the 1970s
2 and only subsequently spread to 
Europe.  The U.S. has never embraced a formal "industrial policy," and the only time that such an 
embrace was seriously debated was in the late 1970s and the 1980s.
3  This was a period when U.S. 
economic growth had slowed appreciably from the relatively rapid growth that had characterized the 
postwar 1946-1973 era, and there were widespread fears that a primary reliance on markets would 
not be sufficient to revive a more vigorous growth environment for the U.S. economy.  It was also a 
period when the Japanese model -- embodying large private enterprises (often characterized as 
"Japan, Inc."), backed explicitly or implicitly by the Japanese government -- was seen as a highly 
successful route to rapid economic growth (and Japanese exports to and investments in the U.S. 
were seen as major threats to the U.S. economy).
4
  Nevertheless, the absence of a formal embrace of industrial policy in the U.S. has not meant 
the total triumph of antitrust and competitive markets and the banishment of governmental 
intervention.  Instead, in the U.S., as well as in other countries, there is a long tradition of 
                                                           
1 For a discussion of European industrial policy, see, for example, Blais (1986) and Pelkmans (2006). 
2 For overviews, see Joskow and Rose (1989), Noll (1989), Joskow and Noll (1994), and Winston (1996, 2006). 
3 See, for example, Behrman (1984a), Lawrence (1984), McCraw (1986), and Thompson (1989). 





governmental intervention -- often at the expense of competitive markets.  Though the extent of 
governmental intervention in the early twenty-first century may be well below its peak of the 1930s, 
it remains a potent force in U.S. political economy -- on both the politics side and the economy side -
- and often remains in an uneasy compromise with antitrust. 
  This essay will be about that uneasy compromise.  In Section II of this paper, we will first 
offer definitions of antitrust and of industrial policy, so as to clarify the discussion that follows.  
Then, in Section III, we provide some details about the major categories of governmental 
intervention that are at odds with the spirit and letter of antitrust policy in the U.S.  Section IV 
provides some reflections on the reasons for these tensions and conflicts.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. Defining Terms 
 
  Although the terms "antitrust" and "industrial policy" may be clear in some readers' minds, 
there is enough ambiguity and range of possibilities that it is worth offering some clarifying 
definitions. 
 
A. Antitrust policy 
  By antitrust policy, I mean policies that are intended to encourage competition in markets 
and encourage the allocative efficiency that generally comes with competition.
5  These policies are 
generally aimed at preventing cartels or other joint efforts at price-fixing (or market allocation, or 
agreements on product attributes), preventing mergers where the consequence would be a significant 
lessening of competition, and preventing unilateral actions by a seller where the consequence would 
be a significant enhancement of the seller's market power.
6  In the U.S., these policies are enunciated 
                                                                                                                                                             
Johnson (1982, 1984), McCraw (1986), and Uekusa and Ide (1986). 
5 As will be seen in the discussion below, where there is seen to be a tension between allocative efficiency and apparent 
competition, antitrust policy in the U.S. has tended to favor allocative efficiency. 
6 Where a merger or a unilateral action that would have likely anticompetitive consequences would also appear to 
promise significant efficiencies, an obvious tension arises; see, for example, Williamson (1968).  Because efficiencies are 
often easy to conjure and to promise and possibly hard to achieve after the fact, U.S. antitrust enforcement has tended to 
treat with skepticism the efficiency claims -- but the tension persists.  See, for example, Baker (2004).  Also, in principle, 





in the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914 (and subsequent amendments to both Acts) 
and in a rich history of clarifying court decisions.
7
  It should be readily admitted that not all of U.S. antitrust policy has always been 
competition-enhancing and/or efficiency-enhancing.  At various times, populism and anti-bigness 
have been important themes, leading to legislation and legal decisions that favored small businesses 
for their own sake.
8  Misguided concerns about vertical restraints (such as tying, exclusive dealing, 
territorial allocations, and resale price maintenance) have impeded effective competition as well as 
efficiency.
9  Critics of U.S. antitrust policy have gone further and questioned more generally the 
efficiency and competitive consequences of the laws and their enforcement,
10 and one critic 
describes antitrust as "industrial policy", with the anticompetitive implications that accompany such 
a label.
11
  Still, the mainstream consensus would surely describe antitrust policy in the U.S. -- 
especially in its current guise -- as oriented toward competition, markets, and efficiency. 
 
B. Industrial policy 
  Defining "industrial policy" is not quite so easy.  Consider the following possibilities: 
  -- "Industrial policy refers to a set of measures taken by a government and aiming at 
influencing a country's performance towards a desired objective." (Pitelis 2006, p. 435) 
  -- "Industrial policy means the initiation and coordination of governmental activities to 
                                                                                                                                                             
or potential market power. 
7 Overviews of the U.S. antitrust laws can be found in various antitrust law texts, such as Areeda and Hovenkamp (2004), 
Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin (2004), Sullivan and Hovenkamp (1999), Sullivan and Grimes (2006), and Hovenkamp 
(1999a, 1999b, 2005), and in economics writings such as Kwoka and White (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004a, 2009). 
8 The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (an amendment to the Clayton Act, which was intended to inhibit manufacturer 
price discrimination that would favor large retailers and which is still intact) and the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 (which 
authorized states to legalize resale price maintenance, at the behest of small retailers who feared the lower prices of retail 
chains, and which was repealed in 1975) are notable pieces of legislation that were expressly designed to favor small 
business.  The decisions by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to block 
mergers in the 1960s, supported by a string of Supreme Court decisions in that decade -- most notably Brown Shoe Co., 
Inc. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962) -- were clearly aimed more at bigness than at realistic concerns about effective 
competition. 
9 See, for example, White (1989) and the discussions of vertical restraints that are found in Kwoka and White (1989, 
1994, 1999, 2004a, 2009). 





leverage upward the productivity and competitiveness of the whole economy and of particular 
industries in it." (Johnson 1984, p. 8) 
  -- "'Industrial policy' refers to all policies designed to affect the allocation of resources 
between and within sectors of the economy." (Lawrence 1986, p. 126) 
  -- "... the term industrial policy indicates the relationship between business and government 
on a microeconomic level..." (Wachter and Wachter 1981, p. 1) 
  -- "Industrial policies are concerned with promoting industrial growth and efficiency." 
(OECD 1975, p. 7) 
  At these broad levels of generalities, every country has an "industrial policy", and there is 
nothing exceptional about the concept.  Indeed, it is the patchwork of U.S. policies that are in tension 
with U.S. antitrust policy that will be the focus of the next section of this paper. 
  At the same time, these broad descriptions do not reach the more distinct notion of industrial 
policy that was driving the debate in the 1970s and 1980s in the U.S. and that continues to be used in 
policy debates concerning industrial policy elsewhere:  In this more distinct notion, industrial policy 
is a concerted, focused, conscious effort on the part of a government to encourage and promote a 
specific industry or sector with an array of policy tools that include subsidies or reduced taxes, trade 
protection, favorable regulation, forced mergers, protection from foreign takeovers, etc.  This was 
the perception within the U.S. of Japanese policies during the 1970s and 1980s.
12  It continues to be 
the perception of some European governments' policies of explicitly favoring "national champions" 
and of "picking winners" but also, possibly, "supporting losers".
13
  Thus, the following seems a better definition of this more specific notion of industrial policy: 
  -- "In current use, the term 'industrial policy' denotes the promotion of specific industrial 
sectors rather than industrialization overall... Industrial policies are direct, micro, and selective; they 
are an attempt by government to influence the decision making of companies or to alter market 
signals; thus they are discriminating... Industrial policy has sometimes sought to support the losers, 
delaying or retarding their decline; in other cases the goal is to succor or catalyze maturing sectors or 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 See Armentano (1999, p. 25). 
12 See, for example, Behrman (1984b), Chalmers (1982, 1984), and McCraw (1986). 





to stimulate advancing sectors." (Driscoll and Behrman 1984, p. 5) 
  This latter sense of industrial policy is the one that the U.S. policy debate considered in the 
1980s and, in the end, shied away from.  But, as we will discuss below, the broader (albeit somewhat 
more vague) version of "industrial policy" remains alive and well in the U.S., as in all other 
countries.  But, since antitrust policy is so well developed and promoted in the U.S., the tensions that 
arise between this well-developed antitrust policy and this persistent patchwork of other policies are 
worth exploring.
14  It is to these tensions that this paper now turns. 
 
III. The Tensions 
 
  Government in the U.S. does not always "speak with a single voice."  Although antitrust, 
with its emphasis on competition and markets, is actively pursued by the federal government,
15 it is 
far from a universally accepted policy across the U.S. political-economy landscape.  Other policies 
that are in conflict with the letter and/or spirit of antitrust policy sometimes involve explicit 
exemptions from the antitrust laws, sometimes involve other federal laws and actions that are simply 
at odds with antitrust policy, and sometimes involve actions by the 50 state governments.  These 
three categories will be explored in turn. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2006). 
14 There is an ironic twist to the tension between antitrust and industrial policy that should be mentioned:  For the 
U.S. telephone industry during much of the 1980s and 1990s – surely a key industry for the U.S. economy during 
this period – the structure and behavior of the industry was largely determined by a single antitrust suit and its 
settlement.  The DOJ had filed suit in October 1974 to dismember AT&T, so as to create more competition in long 
distance telephony and in telephone equipment manufacturing.  The suit ended in January 1982 with a consent 
decree that granted almost everything that the DOJ had wanted: the dismemberment of AT&T into seven local 
operating companies and a separate company (which retained the AT&T company name) that undertook long 
distance and manufacturing operations.  The administration of the decree was the responsibility of Federal District 
Court Judge Harold H. Greene.  Until federal legislation in 1996 (The Telecommunications Act of 1996) created 
new law for the telephone industry, Judge Greene was effectively the administrator of U.S. “industrial policy” for 
this industry.  For further discussion, see, for example, Noll and Owen (1994). 
15 Most of the 50 states also have antitrust laws, which apply to intra-state economic activity.  As is discussed below, the 
individual states pursue their own sets of anticompetitive policies, which are in conflict with their own antitrust laws as 






A. Formal exemptions from the antitrust laws 
  The recently completed "Report and Recommendations" of the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission (2007, p. 378) identified over thirty statutory or judicial exemptions (or partial 
exemptions) from the antitrust laws.  These include: 
  - Agricultural cooperatives; 
  - Fishing cooperatives; 
 -  Insurance; 
  - Export associations; 
  - Cooperative research joint ventures; 
  - Newspaper joint ventures; 
  - Ocean shipping "conferences"; and 
  - Professional baseball. 
In addition, in three federally regulated areas -- banking, telecommunications, and railroads -- 
mergers either require the approval of regulators as well as the relevant antitrust agency (this is true 




B. Federal actions that are at odds with the antitrust laws 
  Governmental actions that limit competition and/or distort the outcomes that markets would 
otherwise bring -- and that are not dealing with the health-safety-environment categories of 
externality/spillover effects or the information asymmetry problems of safety issues or of finance 
that antitrust is not equipped to address -- are clearly at odds with the spirit of the antitrust laws, even 
if there is no clear legal conflict.  Thus, trade protection activities, such as tariffs and quotas on 
imports and anti-dumping measures, inhibit the ability of non-U.S.-based firms to compete with 
domestic producers and are thereby anticompetitive.  Agricultural policies that subsidize and protect 
(and that sometimes inhibit competition among) U.S. farmers is another major category of policies 
                                                           





that is at odds with antitrust policy.  "Buy American" policies for government procurement are 
similarly distorting.  Tax and/or subsidy provisions that selectively favor some industries over others 
and thereby distort allocative efficiency are not uncommon features of the U.S. legislative 
landscape.
17  In addition, the policies of the U.S. Department of Defense and of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), in promoting technological development and usually doing 
it solely through U.S. companies, would also fit into this category. 
  Further, the formal regulatory regimes that have encompassed the transportation, 
telecommunications, energy, and financial sectors have -- especially in the past, less so in the present 
-- tended to inhibit competition among their regulated entities.
18
 
C. Actions by the 50 states 
  In areas of "traditional" regulation, such as transportation, telecommunications, and finance, 
to the extent that the regulated activities have involved intra-state transactions (rather than 
interstate), the 50 states have had the authority to limit competition.  Thus, in the past (less so in the 
present), individual states have limited the ability of banks to establish branch networks (as well as 
preventing banks that are chartered in other states from establishing locations), limited competition 
among local trucking firms, and limited entry by intrastate long-distance telephone carriers. 
  It was only in the early 1940s that litigation addressed the general question of whether 
anticompetitive regulatory actions by the states were exempt from the reach of the federal antitrust 
laws; the issue was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1943.
19  That decision went in favor of the 
states.  This exemption covers not only the regulatory actions of the states, but also the actions of 
private companies that are undertaken under those regulations.  These exemptions apply, so long as 
the restraint on competition is "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" and is 
"actively supervised by the State itself."
20  Thus, state licensing and restrictions on occupations and 
                                                           
17 A current "poster child" for such distortions are the current U.S. policies -- tax, subsidy, regulatory, and import 
protection -- that encourage the production and use of corn-based ethanol as a substitute for gasoline as a motor fuel. 
18 For overviews, see Joskow and Rose (1989), Noll (1989), Joskow and Noll (1994), and Winston (1993, 1998). 
19 The initial Supreme Court case was Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
20 These criteria are enunciated in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 





professions, though anticompetitive, escape the reach of the antitrust laws.
21  Similarly, price 
regulation (and limits on entry) of local taxicab markets and other restrictions on local competition 
are exempt. 
  As was noted above, the insurance industry is explicitly exempted from the reach of the 
federal antitrust laws and is also exempt from federal regulation.  Instead, the industry is regulated 
by the 50 individual states, and distortionary price regulation in the property-casualty and title 





  U.S. antitrust policy has generally been more flexible in accommodating efficiency-
enhancing restraints than is often recognized.  Thus, the need for sports leagues to agree on rules that 
restrain some aspects of competition among the constituent teams, in order to enhance the overall 
quality of the "product" that is offered to fans, has been recognized and allowed.
23  The ability of 
groups of firms -- for example, through trade associations -- to agree on technological standards has 
been allowed.
24  And where the transactions costs of individual negotiations would arguably be too 
large -- as in the negotiations of composers and music publishers with various categories of 
performers and broadcasters -- antitrust has countenanced broad agreements among competitors.
25
  Further, U.S. antitrust has evolved in a direction that is increasingly tolerant of unilateral 
vertical restraints, where their effects are not to facilitate horizontal collusion or to enhance market 
power.
26
  Nevertheless, antitrust policy does not try to address other forms of market failure, such as 
                                                           
21 For discussions of recent efforts by some states to protect "full-service" real estate agents from the competition that 
could be provided by "discount" real estate agents, see Hahn, Litan, and Gurman (2005) and White (2006a). 
22 See, for example, Joskow (1973), White (1984), Bradford (1998), and Harrington (2000). 
23 See, for example, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 
U.S. 85 (1984).  For a discussion of that case, see Horowitz (1999). 
24 But the agreement cannot be a deliberate effort to give an advantage to some firms at the expense of, say, a "maverick". 
 See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); and American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982). 
25 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 





spillovers/externalities in the health-safety-environment areas, public goods problems, or 
asymmetric information problems (e.g., with respect to safety issues or in financial services).
27  
Consequently, even a fervent believer in antitrust policy would expect the enactment of other 
governmental policies -- in response to significant examples of these types of market failure 
problems -- that would supersede what a pure markets-oriented policy would yield. 
  It is clear, however, that much of the policy interventions that were described in Section III 
are not in the category of good-faith efforts to deal with these kinds of market failures.  Instead, even 
though the interventions may sometimes be cloaked in the language of market failure,
28 they often 
simply represent a "concentrated interest" or "capture" model of collective action:
29  A small group 
of parties that care strongly about a specific opportunity for gain may be able to succeed in capturing 
the powers of government so as to benefit itself (i.e., seek rents successfully) at the expense of the 
members of the broader public who individually suffer only small losses and for whom the 
transactions costs of organizing to resist are too great.  Accordingly, they do represent true conflicts 
and tensions with antitrust policy. 
  Further, even where policies are trying to address true externalities -- e.g., air pollution 
problems -- the traditional regulatory tools have involved inefficient "command and control" 
methods; and rent-seeking efforts (and successes), including those that inhibit or distort competition, 
have often been attracted to these regulatory actions.
30  Thus, again, these policies are in conflict 
with antitrust -- in spirit, as well as in practice. 
                                                           
27 One clear instance in which antitrust policy refused to accommodate externality concerns can be found in Fashion 
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
28 For example, the corn-based ethanol program that was noted above has been promoted with arguments that refer to the 
negative spillovers/externalities that arise from gasoline usage. 
29 See, for example, Stigler (1971), Posner(1971, 1974), and Olson (1965). 
30 See, for example, Ackerman and Hassler (1981) and Crandall (1983a, 1983b).  Similarly, the U.S. policies that have 
traditionally been applied to other negative externalities, such as the use of the electromagnetic spectrum (broadcast 
telecommunications) and the problems of over-fishing, have involved command-and-control regulation and the inhibition 
of entry and of competition.  Only relatively recently have more pro-competitive policies, such as spectrum auctions and 








  Antitrust is not the sole policy pursued by governments, and Pareto optimality is not the goal 
of any known government.  Government policies in the U.S. are not exceptions to these statements. 
  Thus, in considering antitrust policy in the U.S. and the collection of other policies, which 
might loosely be called the U.S.'s informal industrial policy, the perception of conflicts, tensions, 
and tradeoffs is an accurate reflection of reality.  However, the domain of competitive markets, and 
of the applicability of antitrust policy, has surely grown since the 1930s and even since the 1970s.  
But there is still room for considerably more growth in this domain.  Cautious optimism is probably 
in order; but so is constant vigilance, since (as the recent corn-based ethanol experience vividly 
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